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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1  Background and aim 
 
Most Western corporations are facing an immediate need to 
transform the way their businesses are run, in order to 
meet the quality, lead time and product development 
demands of the 1990s. There are several examples of 
companies which are trying to respond to the increasing 
competition, primarily from Japanese companies, with 
piecemeal changes. Possibly they are reluctant to accept 
that the rules of the game have changed, that 
improvements on a massive scale are needed just to 
survive. At the same time, other companies are beginning 
to understand that this type of change is needed but do 
not know how it can be accomplished. This is often due to 
different barriers in the organization related to the 
company's culture, history and other specific conditions, 
wich could cause a resistance to a change process. 
Further barriers could include the lack of strong leaders 
or of role models for a major change process. 
 
How can such major transformations take place? Do we have 
any companies that can demonstrate ways of achieving 
them? Are there any Western "success stories" to tell?   
 
One identified case, which can illustrate such a 
transformation process, is the US electronics and radio-
communication company Motorola, the first winner of the 
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in 1988. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Motorola showed a tremendous 
change towards world competitive quality levels, 
production costs and lead times, as an effect of a 
company-wide quality program.  
 
  2 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relevance of 
total quality management1 as a tool for increasing 
external and internal capability to achieve greater 
customer satisfaction and competitiveness. The 
experiences and results achieved at Motorola will be 
examined.  
 
 
1.2  Methodology  
 
The primary means of data collection for this study has 
been 21 in-depth interviews conducted in 1991 at all 
levels within Motorola, including the present and the 
former CEOs, general managers at sector and group level, 
managers at top levels in all different functional areas 
including personnel and finance, and development 
engineers. However, no interviews have been conducted 
with the workers on the shop floor. In addition to the 
interviews, we have supplemented our findings with 
secondary source information, in the form of internally 
written articles, documents and videos, as well as 
interviews published in trade journals.  
 
The quality change program in Motorola will be examined 
and presented in the following sequence: the motive for 
the program, when and how it was implemented, critical 
incidents and important actors during the process, 
content of the program, and methods used for 
organizational change.  
 
It is important to note that a change process, in this 
case a quality program, does not start from zero. There 
is always a particular history of each company which 
influences the way that is being selected and what path 
                                                          
1.In this paper "total quality management" (TQM) is used interchangeably with "total 
quality control" (TQC) or "company-wide-quality-control" (CWQC). This means that our 
use of TQC is in the wider Japanese sense including the involvement of all persons, 
also the shop-floor workers, in the quality activities and responsibilities, and not in the 
more narrow sense of limiting the responsibilities to the quality specialists, as defined 
by Feigenbaum (1961). 
 
  3
the change process takes (Moss Kanter 1983). Hence, a 
comment is included which describes the influence of the 
history of the company on the change process. 
 
In this paper we have chosen to analyze the quality 
change programs according to a model of organizational 
change developed in Alänge (1991). The influence of the 
change activities is analyzed on four levels: technical, 
social, political and cultural. 
 
 
1.3  Our model of change 
 
The model below provides a picture of four different 
dimensions: the technical, the social, the political and 
the cultural. For a successful outcome of a process of 
organizational change, it is essential to consider these 
four dimensions simultaneously.  
 
This view is based on Tichy's (1983) notion of the 
importance of simultaneously solving three organizational 
dilemmas: the technical design problem, the political 
allocation problem and the cultural/ideological mix 
problem. The technical design refers to the 
organization's production output and how its social and 
technical resources can be arranged to fulfill the 
demands on output.2  
 
Most production organizations are built up by technical 
systems, i.e. machines and equipment, which set some of 
the boundaries for what it is possible to change in the 
organization. In particular, the work tasks and work 
organization on the shop floor level, i.e. for blue-
collar workers, may be very dependent on the machine 
configuration. However, white-collar workers can also be 
                                                          
2. Tichy (1983) includes the deployment of financial resources into the technical 
design area. In our model, the financial resources are seen as means for investments 
in and control of the technical and social systems, i.e. the financial resources have a 
political dimension as well.  
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dependent on hardware investments and configurations, 
e.g. in terms of available scientific instruments and 
computer terminals.  
 
The social system refers to the human resources in the 
organization and how they and the organization are 
structured. This system can operate according to a more 
explicit means, and can be adjusted through changes in, 
for example, strategy and goal formulation and 
communication, formal organization charts, selecting and 
developing skills, fitting people to roles, defining 
their responsibilities, specifying performance criteria 
and measuring performance, developing information and 
planning systems, and fostering the development of 
information networks.    
 
 
                                     
      ┌──────────┐ 
      │ Culture  │ 
      └─┬──────┬─┘ 
        │      │                  
        │      │ 
        │      │        
        │     ┌┴────────────────┐ 
        │     │ Political power │ 
        │     └─────┬─────┬─────┘ 
        │           │     │ 
        │           │     │ 
       ┌┴───────────┴──┐  │      
       │ Social system │  │ 
       └────────┬──────┘  │ 
                │         │         
                │         │          Technical design        
                │         │         
         ┌──────┴─────────┴─┐ 
         │ Technical system │ 
         └──────────────────┘ 
 
 
Figure 1.  A model of organizational change components 
 
 
The political system concerns the task of allocating 
power and resources in an organization. The concepts and 
language are less formal or explicit, and often less 
obvious, than is the case for the technical design 
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problem. Performance appraisals, compensation programs 
and career decisions are often reflections of this system 
area. Management of the internal power structures is 
another area, concerning who gets information and is 
involved in the planning and mission-setting processes, 
distribution of power across the role structures, the 
balancing of power across different functions within the 
company, and who is not involved, etc.  
 
The cultural/ideological area concerns the range of 
values, objectives, beliefs and interpretations of past 
and current events which are held by the organizational 
members. Decisions to change corporate culture are not 
always made explicitly; instead they are often made 
implicitly, intuitively, and by trial and error. Often, 
this area concerns the development of a culture aligned 
with mission and strategy, where values and philosophies 
have a coherent influence. It is mostly developed through 
symbolic events, the communication of "success stories", 
by communicating and clarifying key values, by role-
modeling in key persons, through the development of 
subcultures, by selection of people and management of 
rewards to reinforce the key values, and by fostering 
friendship and affective networks to shape and reinforce 
the culture. 
 
Resistance to a change process can occur in these 
different dimensions, as follows.  
 
First, the technological system itself can create 
barriers to change; e.g. an operator may be tied to the 
continuous monitoring of a machine, thereby limiting the 
technical autonomy and judgement of individuals. 
 
Second, on the social level, an individual might resist 
change due to a number of reasons including: habit, fear 
of the unknown, lack of skills, unpredictability, and 
"sunk costs". 
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Third, on the political level, resistance to change may 
occur because of conflicts around the allocation of 
resources and power in the organization. For individuals 
the resistance can be due to need for power, 
overdependence on others, competition for power; and on 
the organizational level, due to threats to powerful 
coalitions, resource limitations and "sunk costs". 
 
Fourth, resistance to change may be due to cultural 
issues, including: selective perception (cultural 
filters), values and beliefs, conformity to norms, and 
climate for change. 
 
In section 3, the framework of the above four-dimensional 
model is used to analyze the Motorola approach of using 
total quality management as a means of organizational 
change. The influence of the Motorola change activities 
on the technical, social, political and cultural levels 
is analyzed.  
 
 
2.  A quality change process 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Motorola is the major US manufacturer of two-way radios, 
cellular radios, semiconductors and integrated circuits, 
and a major supplier of government electronics and 
information systems. Motorola's generic strategy can be 
classified as cost leadership in combination with 
differentiation through innovative features and with very 
high product quality. Motorola has experienced strong 
growth during the 1980s, from US$ 8.3 billion in 1988, 
and US$ 9.6 billion in 1989, to more than US$ 11 billion 
in 1990. It is a global company, in such a way that its 
production takes place in many different parts of the 
world and, of its market, more than 50% is outside the 
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USA. It is also a very research- intensive corporation 
and R&D/sales was 8.1% in 1989. Motorola was the first 
winner of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in 
1988. 
 
 
2.2  Motives for change 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Motorola found itself 
being forced out of areas where it traditionally had been 
among the leading manufacturers in the world, by Japanese 
suppliers of better and/or cheaper products. The bow-out 
started with consumer products such as car radios and 
television sets, but continued with Motorola being forced 
to abandon its dynamic random-access memories (DRAMs) 
manufacturing in 1985/86. The latter constituted an 
important negative break into the core of Motorola's 
high-technology domain. In addition, a need of 
accelerated improvement became apparent through 
benchmarking efforts3 made throughout the company, 
combined with projections of what the customer 
expectation would become in the years ahead. 
 
This negative trend, of being forced to abandon product 
areas, became a strong driving impetus for radical 
improvement in the early 1980s. Motorola used all 
available ways to become more competitive, including: 
lobbying in Washington to obtain protection, entering 
into R&D consortium for semiconductors, and forging 
strategic alliances with a major Japanese competitor, 
Toshiba, in order to receive new competitive DRAM 
technology in exchange for Motorola's world-class 
microprocessor technology, in 1988. Motorola also decided 
on a strategy to try to beat the Japanese on their home 
                                                          
 
3. Benchmarking means a systematic comparison with the best-practice company for 
each specific process, e.g. invoicing or product development (which means that 
different companies are chosen for comparison and that they do not have to be in 
the same industry). 
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market, and to learn from the Japanese by cutting down 
the NIH barriers through a TQC way of working adapted to 
the Motorola context.  
 
In 1982, Motorola developed a new pager with considerably 
higher quality levels than earlier generations in order 
to enter the Japanese market. In this connection, 
Motorola made the very important finding that there was a 
strong positive relationship between higher quality and 
lower cost, which contradicted earlier truths in US 
industry. Thus, it provided Motorola with internal 
indications of the promising route of TQC.4 
 
 
2.3  When, how, and the purpose 
 
According to the "official" history of the quality 
improvement process at Motorola, it all began in 1979, 
when a National Sales Manager, Art Sundry, stood up at an 
upper management meeting and declared: "our customers say 
that our quality levels really stink". This comment 
initiated a process at Motorola, which led the CEO and 
his executives to start touring around the world to visit 
other companies. What they found in Japan, plants with 
1000 times better quality performance, convinced them 
that something must be done. But how? 
 
In 1980, one of the senior business managers became the 
Motorola Director of Quality. This indicated a change, 
putting quality in focus, when a high executive was 
                                                          
4.In the case of pagers, Motorola now has a 30% market share on the Japanese 
market, attributed to a very competitive quality level, with very high product 
reliability (MTBF of more than 150 years). The market share is a direct result of a clause 
in the contract with NTT, indicating that the supplier with the highest reliability also 
should have the largest market share. This was a clause introduced by Motorola. 
However, at least part of the reason for the start of this success stems from 
Washington putting pressure on Japan to import electronics goods from the USA. 
  "What won the day for Motorola was not its reputation for first-rate customer service 
and technical support. It wasn't even the outstanding quality of its products and 
design expertise. .... What made the difference? Resolute and protracted pressure 
from Washington."  (Business Week, November 1989) 
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selected to become a corporate champion for quality as a 
complement to the efforts made by the CEO office. 
  
In the early 1980s different programs were introduced, 
e.g. the Tool Management Factory and the Manufacturing 
Technology Centre, but the result of these in terms of 
quality performance was not impressive. 
 
In 1981, the first firm step towards a quality revolution 
was taken by establishing goals for quality improvement, 
which exceeded earlier thinking about what could be 
accomplished. The Operating and Policy Committee approved 
a five-year goal of a ten-fold improvement in quality, 
regardless of how quality was measured. Several 
difficulties arose because of problems of comparison 
between different parts of the organization; e.g. 
managers' bonuses were based on quality, but nobody could 
approve or disapprove because the results were not 
comparable, and when different divisions met it was "a 
tower of Babel" because a common language of 
communication, as regards quality improvement, was 
missing. Nevertheless, this phase, between 1981 and 1986, 
gave promising results in terms of quality improvement. 
By 1986 most divisions met the goal, which in 1981 had 
been seen by many as impossible to meet. Hence, the 
project provided indications that quite considerable 
improvements were possible. But it was not enough; a 
major jump in improvement was still required, because 
benchmarking had shown that Motorola's competitors were 
sometimes 100 times better, even though not in exactly 
the same products. This finding became the strongest 
impetus for radical change in 1987.  
 
In 1987, the CEO and the Operating and Policy Committee 
established even tougher goals for quality improvement 
over the next five years. However, they would hardly have 
succeeded in increasing the rate of change, if they had 
not at the same time found the "magic tool" for 
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organizational change, "management by uniform 
measurements". This consisted in the creation of a single 
metric for quality, i.e. a common language which made it 
possible for everyone to compare his quality performance 
with other departments or groups at Motorola. In 
addition, it provided top management with a tool to 
follow up and assess improvements in one section in 
relation to other sections. The common metric was Total 
Defects per Unit, where a defect was anything which 
caused customer dissatisfaction, a customer was the next 
person in the process, and a unit was any unit of work. 
To make all different work processes comparable, Motorola 
introduced the procedure of comparing defects found in 
relation to the number of opportunities that existed to 
make errors, for each specific process.  
  
This common metric was first used by the Communications 
Sector in 1985 and it was fully adopted by that Sector in 
1986. It contributed to such a startling improvement in 
the Communications Sector that the same metric was 
adopted by the whole corporation in January 1987. 
Motorola's goals for the next five years were set to 
improve 10 times by 1989, 100 times by 1991, and to 
achieve Six Sigma Capability by 1992. In Motorola, Six 
Sigma capability meant a maximum of 3.4 defects per 
million opportunities of error.5 
 
In combination with the introduction of this unifying 
metric for measuring defects, Motorola changed from 
measuring a large number of quality- and productivity-
related variables to measuring a few, selected in order 
to directly contribute to change. The basis for this was 
the overriding goal of Total Customer Satisfaction, 
introduced in mid-1987, which was accompanied by five key 
operational initiatives. The first was the above- 
mentioned Six Sigma Quality goal, and the remaining four 
                                                          
5. That is, six sigma adjusted for a deviation of process mean of 1.5 sigma to one side. 
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were: total cycle time reduction, product and 
manufacturing leadership, profit improvement, and 
participative management. Of the latter four, cycle time 
reduction was the most operational for inducing 
improvements, since it was directly measureable and could 
easily be used for comparisons.   
 
However, the main vehicle for transforming the company 
since 1987 has been the Six Sigma Quality Program, whose 
key ingredients (according to Smith 1988) are: (1) A 
superordinate goal of "Total Customer Satisfaction"; (2) 
common, uniform quality metrics for all areas of the 
business; (3) identical improvement-rate goals for all 
areas of the business, based on uniform metrics;  
(4) goal-directed incentives for both management and 
employees; (5) coordinated training in "why" and "how" to 
achieve the goal.6 
 
 
2.4  Content of the quality program 
 
At Motorola it was acknowledged that aggressive quality 
goals had to be accompanied by training. During the 
1980s, Motorola's corporate training function has put an 
increasing percentage of its resources into quality. In 
1985 37%, in 1986 43% and in 1987 73% of the total 
training was devoted to quality. In 1987, Motorola spent 
2.4% of the corporate payroll on training. It was a 
demand that 40% of this training, for each Motorolan, was 
required to be directly devoted to quality-related 
matters.  
 
The considerable increase in the amount of quality-
related training in 1987 reflected the new set of even 
tougher goals, including the Six Sigma capability by 
                                                          
6. In addition to the above goals, Motorola introduced a short-term impetus in Jan. 
1987, the goal to correct all such defects that the customer would take notice of by 
March 31, 1987. 
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1992. Before this date, several courses had been 
developed, but these new goals placed a demand on a major 
shift in training intensity and coverage. Without 
intensive training of all categories of Motorolans, and 
not least the training of the total engineering 
workforce, in design for manufacturing and simultaneous 
engineering, the new goals would have remained paper 
goals.  
 
In March 1987, a new course was launched, "Design for 
Manufacturing". It had a predecessor with the same name, 
but that one had been a very general course, which did 
not provide the practical guidelines needed. The new 
course was not a tool box, but it provided the necessary 
understanding of the "miracle link" between defects per 
unit and cycle time, of the Six Sigma benchmarking, of 
the capability index, of the relationship between latent 
defects and total defects in products, as well as of the 
relationship between the design process and defects per 
unit. In short, it taught the engineers how to design a 
product virtually defect-free.  
 
There was an instant need for training of all Motorola 
engineers in "Design for Manufacturing", because of the 
aggressive quality goals introduced in January 1987. By 
using the regular Motorola training, at most 80 persons 
could be trained per week, which was very far from the 
demand for training. The solution became to train 
engineering managers to become instructors in this 
specific course. For a start, eight Motorolans were 
trained during one week to become the teachers of the 
engineering managers. These eight were split up in four 
teams with two teachers in each, who in one week each 
could train 8 engineering managers. The result was that 
after 2 weeks Motorola had 32 engineering manager 
instructors, after 3 weeks 64 instructors, and so on. 
These instructors, the engineering managers who came from 
the line organization, trained their own subordinates in 
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a 2-day course in "Design for Manufacturing". The result 
was that Motorola accomplished the massive training of 
all their 15,000 engineers in only eight months' time. 
 
Besides being a very rapid way of introducing the 
knowledge needed on a massive scale, this form of 
training had several additional advantages. As the 
instructor was the line manager, the focus of the course 
automatically became the use of the new knowledge in the 
everyday work. In addition, the line managers had the 
advantage, as compared to ordinary trainers, of being 
able to relate the problems to their own and their 
subordinates' product area. In relation to earlier case 
instructions, this was a considerable improvement. The 
managers' implementation of the knowledge became more 
thorough as well, depending on the way they themselves 
learned; i.e. to teach is also to reinforce the learning.  
 
Other areas of Motorola have also benefitted from this 
thorough training of engineering managers, through the 
promotion from this group of instructors into positions 
of product managers and senior product managers. This 
means that Motorola today has a number of product 
managers with hands-on experience of "Design for 
Manufacturing".  
 
This course, and a course in basic problem-solving, are 
the only mandatory courses for the Motorola engineers. 
All other courses can be taken free of choice. Motorola 
today has a set of 100 courses provided by the Motorola 
University. Included are courses in statistical process 
control, design for manufacturability, understanding Six 
Sigma capability for persons outside direct production 
and design functions, benchmarking and robust design. 
Motorola has developed quality-related training programs 
for all levels within the company, including the senior 
executives, all line and support managers as well as 
supervisors and workers.  
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In addition, Motorola's suppliers have been invited to, 
and are required to, attend the training courses at 
Motorola University in Six Sigma and statistical process 
control. Motorola itself has concluded that Total 
Customer Satisfaction and world-class competitiveness 
would not be possible without first-class suppliers, but 
the requirement for the suppliers to take the courses 
does not originate from the company. It comes from 
Motorola's advisory council, Partnership for Growth, 
which was founded in 1982 and consists of suppliers and 
Motorola. However, since a year ago this council has 
turned the question around by asking how Motorola can 
become a World-Class Customer to its suppliers; i.e. the 
council today provides an equal focus on what Motorola 
has to change.  
   
The existence of a wide variety of training courses is 
only the first step; what really matters according to the 
TQC philosophy is what is implemented in practice. The 
Motorola approach can be revealed by the following words 
of Bill Smith: "Naturally, all the tools for quality 
improvement have been common knowledge for many years. 
The key to a successful quality improvement process is 
not the tools themselves, but rather in the pervasive use 
of these tools within everyday conduct of business."  
 
 
2.5  Actors 
 
If we look at the change process from an actor's point of 
view, there are several important inputs made by 
different individuals during the action. Of course, the 
role of the then CEO, Bob Galvin, immediately comes 
forward; but in the "official" Motorola success story, 
other actors are also emphasized, partly to communicate 
the message of general change. In the following section, 
some of the critical roles in the implementation of a 
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major organizational change project will be discussed. In 
Table 1, a set of seven important roles is presented.7  
 
Table 1. Actors - critical roles 
 
 Initiator    -    "our customers think our  
                   quality levels really stink" 
 
 Change agent   -  teacher, idea man; 
                   background outside Motorola  
 
 Communicator   -  on top level, brings the new ideas in 
                   and elevates them; change agent mentor 
 
 Diffusor     -    implemented the new ideas immediately 
                   in his spin-off unit 
 
 Brutal action man  - a forceful businessman, frustrated,  
                      looking for a solution  
 
 Process mentor -  top management, personal involvement,  
                   credibility, environment creator; 
                   a "listener and role model" 
 
 Continuator   -   new CEO, continued top level support;  
                   background includes quality - measure!! 
 
 
One important point is that the awareness of the need for 
major change to meet strong Japanese competition existed 
long before some of the important tools for change were 
developed. Furthermore, although the CEO had been 
extremely important in creating an environment conducive 
to training and change, many of the ideas needed 
initially grew and were nurtured outside the CEO office. 
                                                          
7. These roles have all been generated empirically, in order to describe the change 
process from an actor's point of view. Some of the categories applied, such as the 
'change agent' and the 'mentor', can be found in earlier literature, e.g. Rogers (1983), 
but the use in this study does not necessarily correspond fully to earlier use.  
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Several of the new quality approaches were developed 
within the Communications Sector; they were first tested 
there, and later implemented on a wider basis within the 
whole corporation. Hence, Bob Galvin, as the former CEO, 
primarily saw himself as a listener, who was sensitive to 
good ideas and had the ability of amplifying and adding 
value to the ideas, and then forcefully communicating 
them throughout the corporation once their potential had 
been proven; i.e. he was the process mentor. 
  
The role of the initiator was to bring up the question of 
quality on the agenda, and Motorola from then on used 
this specific occasion, Art Sundry's comment that "our 
quality stinks", to communicate the message of a need for 
major quality improvement.  
 
In the mid 1980's, Bill Smith, the quality manager at the 
Communications Sector who joined Motorola in 1978, had 
insights into Juran's teaching, experience from working 
in Armand Feigenbaum's consultancy company, and knowledge 
of Japanese practices. He became the change agent coming 
up with ideas about how to proceed. It was Bill Smith who 
originally wrote a relatively technical paper focusing on 
latent defects and arguing for six sigma quality. This 
paper was presented at a seminar in September 1984.  
 
At the September seminar, a knowledgeable top manager 
grasped the idea and became the mentor of the change 
agent, and arranged for a presentation for the top 
management within the Communications Sector in December 
1984. In January 1985, the decision was taken to start 
measuring defects within the Communications Sector. In 
addition, this top manager took it upon his shoulders to 
communicate the new ideas in understandable ways. He 
became the communicator of the new concept, and his 
function was to amplify Bill Smith's six sigma into SIX 
SIGMA. By the assistance of Bill Smith, he developed 
easily communicated graphs illustrating processes of 4, 5 
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and up to 6.3 sigma. The 6.3-sigma process concerns the 
function of normal aeroplanes, i.e. the message was 
clear; it is possible to attain the 6-sigma level. Later 
on, in 1989, he became the corporate director of quality 
and could continue to get his message through.    
 
The diffusor, the head of the cellular division, attended 
the initial top management meeting at Communications 
Sector, when Bill Smith presented his ideas. Within 3 
weeks after the meeting, the cellular division was spun 
off and moved to a new location, but the communicator 
brought the ideas there and implemented them immediately. 
The starting point was to give the engineers involved in 
developing the new cellular telephone the message that, 
unless the total defect estimate for the new product 
generation had been lowered by one quarter, the product 
wouldn't be authorized. The result was that the engineers 
themselves turned to Bill Smith to get assistance in 
finding the methods. The way to succeed was by applying 
the principles of fewer parts (from 1500 to 750, from 11 
circuit boards to two) and simpler manufacturing (from 27 
steps to 18). It should be added that, except for the 
head of the cellular division, there were more 
individuals within Motorola who took a similar role of 
diffusing the new ideas into other sectors of the 
company.8 
 
Without fully understanding the statistical intricacies, 
the corporate director of quality, who was eagerly 
looking for a way of increasing the rate of change, 
adopted the 6-sigma concept as a device of change, once 
it was fully established that it worked in the 
Communications Sector. One reason for this was that the 
                                                          
8. Although Table 1 provides a set of seven actors or individuals who were of 
importance for the Motorola change process, these seven critical roles can possibly 
be found among more individuals within Motorola, depending on the unit of analysis. 
For example, there are surely more individuals who performed the role of diffusor for 
their respective work units, and even the role of change agent can be found at 
different levels of Motorola. Bob Galvin expressed this in a video presentation by 
referring to "the Bill Smiths of Motorola" (Fischer & Galvin 1991).  
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concept of Six Sigma had some distinct advantages as a 
tool for change. It was an absolute quantitative measure, 
and the figure/word combination, both starting with an 
"s", was easy to remember and communicate. As a forceful 
businessman and manager, he cleared the way in the rest 
of the organization and brought the new concept out into 
the organization. His function could best be 
characterized as being a brutal action man who got things 
moving on a wider scale. 
 
As the seventh role we have added the continuator, 
meaning the role of the new CEO to continue with the same 
focus on the quality change process. This new CEO has a 
long history of participating in the quality program, 
including having a position as a quality manager during 
some time, and being involved in taking decisions during 
the early introduction of Six Sigma at Communications 
Sector in 1985. To ensure that the same focus was kept 
although the CEO was replaced, the new CEO to come was 
selected 1.5 years ahead of the actual switch of 
position, which gave the old and the new CEO considerable 
time to make a smooth transition. This is definitely not 
a typical procedure for changes of CEOs in US 
corporations, whereas Japanese companies show a similar 
pattern, keeping the former top managers as working 
senior advisors for several years after their retirement. 
The point to be made is, though, that this is a normal 
procedure for Motorola, e.g. in the case of change of 
corporate chief financial officer, in order to bring 
about a greater continuity.  
 
The above-described roles were all important for 
implementing change in Motorola, but the quality of the 
individual assuming the specific role is also of immense 
importance. A Motorola employee presents this view of the 
top management at Motorola:  
"Most important of all is the role of top management. 
Motorola is singularly blessed because those at the very 
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top are leaders, not just managers; visionaries, not just 
bureaucrats; inspirers, not just controllers." (Bhote 
1989) 
 
  
2.6  Methods of accomplishing change 
 
The Motorola way of accomplishing major change throughout 
the company consists of a wide variety of activities and 
measures, with the same intention of giving a strong 
message of the goals of defect-free production, short 
lead times and total customer satisfaction.  
 
In order to make the personnel aware of the challenge, 
i.e. unfreeze in the terminology of Kurt Lewin (1947), a 
great number of examples from the major competitors in 
Japan was brought in as stories. These stories had the 
function of establishing an awareness of the extent of 
the challenge. One example is the story about the 
Japanese TV manufacturer who had only one single test at 
the end of the line, on and off. No advanced measurement 
equipment, just this simple test if the TV worked or not. 
The manufacturing process was under such control that 
virtually no variation in quality existed once it worked. 
However, if the television did not work, the first step 
was to call for the CEO to personally visit the shop 
floor and solve the problem. This of course provided a 
very strong signal to the Motorolans: it is possible to 
have virtually zero-defect production. 
 
In combination with these examples brought in from 
competitors, the leaders of the company set examples. 
Especially the former CEO, Bob Galvin, was involved in 
all steps and initiated the broad-band activities. It was 
Bob Galvin who presented every Motorolan with the 
challenge of comparing him/herself and competing with 
his/her "counterpart" in their Japanese competitor 
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company, just as Bob Galvin had to stand up to the 
qualities of Mr Morita of Sony Corporation.  
 
Other well-known "success stories" have been widely used 
in order to get the message through to every employee. 
One was about how Bob Galvin in 1986 set the stage by 
saying that the Operating Policy Committee had the wrong 
agenda, and insisted on putting quality as the first 
point. When this change had been made, the quality 
matters had been discussed and the financial performance 
was the next point, Bob Galvin got up and left. This was 
of course an extremely strong way of setting the stage, 
especially as he made a habit of leaving after the 
quality discussion and before operations are discussed. 
In addition, the Motorola way of turning this into a 
story that is told over and over, makes it diffuse all 
through the organization and become an essential tool of 
change. 
 
Another visible action which stresses the importance of 
quality is that the CEO also chaired the Operations and 
Policy Committee eight times a year only to talk about 
quality. 
 
In addition, when a new CEO was to be appointed, a senior 
manager with specific quality experience was selected 
from a group of many capable managers. 
 
To show the importance of defect-free production, 
Motorola used a special method of communicating the 
message to the workers in the production of fixed-parts 
printed circuit boards. For each circuit board having one 
of four types of major defects: wrong weld, wrong part, 
missing part or reversed part, the order was to throw all 
defective circuit boards into a special basket. The 
employees initially thought that this was only another 
management gimmick, and they were convinced that another 
group of employees later repaired the faulty products. 
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However, such was not the case, as Motorola was aware of 
the fact that a repaired product always has a higher 
probability of failure, and with the new quality levels 
applied, this was not acceptable any more. Even more 
important was to give the employees a strong signal about 
the need for defect-free production; hence, the 
management went out to the specific work area and broke 
the defective circuit boards into pieces, to make sure 
that the workers got a strong visible message. 
 
The "bandit line" at the pager factory in Florida is yet 
another example of the Motorola way of communicating a 
visible message through the organization. This production 
line was designed as an experimental greenhouse, with the 
intention to make use of all the best ideas and equipment 
that existed in the world. Even the name in itself, 
"bandit", refers to the intention of "stealing" and 
adopting all good ideas, i.e. it was a war against the 
Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome. In the factory signs 
had been put up indicating that NIH was forbidden; others 
read "steal every idea you can", and every visitor could 
see a big sign saying "Don't leave here without leaving a 
good idea behind". The experiences and the knowledge 
developed from the bandit line contributed to excellent 
improvement results in the pager factory. The lead time 
from order to shipment to customer decreased from 40 days 
in the early 1980s to one hour and 30 minutes in 1985/86. 
This lead time is today down even further, to one hour 
and 10 minutes. 
 
In Motorola, a very consistent picture exists of what 
happened during the process leading to the Six Sigma 
program. This story is shared by Motorolans at all 
different levels within the company; see e.g. the 
introduction above, which starts with Art Sundry's 
comment that "our quality levels stink". Motorola is 
using these kind of stories both internally and 
externally, in order to communicate the message to bring 
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about change as well as a new view of the high-quality 
company. Motorola is using these descriptions of the 
company history, where the more important events are 
emphasized, over and over again. In our 21 interviews at 
all levels within the Motorola organization, it was 
amazing how consistent the stories were about what had 
taken place. This was of course reinforced by the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award requirement, for the 
winners, of diffusing experiences through speeches and 
articles throughout US society. The success stories of 
the 1988 winner, Motorola, have been presented in 
hundreds of speeches and in a considerable number of  
interviews and articles. The Award can be seen as the 
frame for a change program and the Six Sigma goal as its 
vehicle.  
 
It should also underline that Motorola, even after 
achieving considerable success in increasing quality 
levels, has still tried to establish a strong feeling for 
the need of change and continuous improvement among its 
employees. This is not expressed in direct crisis 
terminology, but Motorola stresses that it is a matter of 
survival.  
 
"With lower cost, we will be more competitive. We can 
reduce prices and achieve a higher share of the market. 
We can invest more in new product development and 
marketing programs. We can share more profits! It's a 
WIN-WIN situation for everyone - but more than that, it 
is a competitive necessity. You know from your personal 
experience that competitors from all over the world are 
becoming more competent at an increasingly rapid rate. It 
is no understatement to say that achieving Six Sigma 
performance throughout Motorola is truly a matter of 
survival." (Weisz video tape, 1988). 
 
In addition, Motorola's way of presenting its SPC courses 
is different, as compared to the common practice in 
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Swedish companies, where the focus is normally on process 
control. "It explains SPC as a set of problem-solving 
tools applied within a problem-solving strategy to 
implement Total Quality Improvement. Continuous 
improvement toward zero defects in products and 
components is the objective." 
 
According to a senior manager, Motorola needs American 
management instruments to measure and compete. 
Measurement is used only to accomplish change. In 
comparison, Japanese teams do not use this kind of 
measurements because they have a strong culture of 
improvement. Motorola has not yet reached that stage, and 
hence there is a need for measurement. 
 
Motorola's basic view on measurement is that only what 
matters for the customer should be measured, i.e. to 
concentrate only on the important measures. It should be 
pointed out that Motorola's definition of Total Customer 
Satisfaction includes total employee satisfaction. 
Furthermore, there is an optimal number of measurements, 
because the less you measure, the less opportunity to 
manage and control. 
 
Motorola has increasingly been sending out very strong 
signals to the managers on different levels that they 
have to follow and support the new way of management, or 
else they must leave their position. For example, if the 
metric shows a high level of defects or a plateau in the 
improvement pace, the reason is investigated. If the 
group of senior managers, who conduct the regular 
operations reviews, find that the reason for the poor 
performance has to do with a manager's commitment, the 
manager will be replaced and possibly moved to a staff 
assignment. In the opposite case, of a good result in 
terms of a low level of defects, then the outcome may be 
a higher salary and an offering of a better job. 
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The same kinds of strong managerial signals are provided 
in other areas of management performance, which are 
considered as important for Motorola. For example, the 
goal of participative management within and cooperation 
between organizations implies that, if a manager can 
establish good cooperation with his subordinates and 
other organizations, then he will be rewarded. On the 
other hand, if a condition of poor cooperation evolves, 
then the manager is moved from his position.  
 
Motorola aims at involving all employees, including the 
shop floor workers, in the change process. For this 
purpose, Motorola has formed TCS teams (Total Customer 
Satisfaction teams), which are a form of quality control 
circles. In 1990, a total of 2,000 teams existed at 
Motorola, 1,200 of them in the  Communications Sector. 
During 1991 the latter number has increased to around 
2,000 teams in the Communications sector alone, and in 
early 1992 there were about 3,500, and they averaged 8 to 
10 members each.  The TCS teams are formed by individuals 
from different departments and levels. The problem that 
they focus on is approved by management through the 
guidance of the "five key initiatives": lowering defects, 
shorter lead time, product leadership (doing the right 
things), profit improvement, and participative management 
and cooperation. The TCS teams are free to use any tools, 
which is a difference in relation to the Japanese QC 
circles, where a more standardized way of working with 
approved tools is being enforced. The TCS teams are 
building on the American tradition of setting targets to 
solve something essential and then getting there, 
regardless of the tools used. According to Bill Smith 
(1991), the difference between a Japanese QC circle 
working on a "Kaizen type" of continuous improvement and 
the TCS teams is that the Motorola goal is "aggressive" 
continuous improvement. 
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2.7  Barriers to change and how to break them down 
 
Initially, the Motorola way of measuring defects per unit 
(in relation to the opportunities of making an error) met 
some resistance within the organization. Motorola had 
developed this way of measuring in order to permit 
comparisons of quality levels and improvements in 
products with different complexity. For example, to 
compare the total number of errors in a pager containing 
130 parts directly with an EMX containing 150,000 parts 
would have been hard, if the adjustment by the 
opportunity of making an error had not been introduced. 
Still, the opponents claimed that the opportunities of 
error were not comparable and opted for a never-changing 
standard of comparison.  
 
The most severe resistance to the Six Sigma program came 
from the statisticians in the organization, especially 
from those with a Ph.D., and less so from the M.Sc. They 
considered the defect-per- unit measurements to be less 
accurate and pointed to a considerable error in 
measurement, at least 5-10%.  
 
The Motorola way of tackling this resistance was to 
recognize that a perfect standard of comparison did not 
exist, and that the Motorola way of measuring defects and 
opportunities would never be totally perfect. But if the 
goal is a 68% reduction of defects per year, then a 5% 
error in measurement does not really mean very much. On a 
time scale it would mean an error in measurement of 
quality improvement by one month. Furthermore, the 
definition of a defect itself is based on the notion of 
meeting customer satisfaction, and hence this measure is 
also changing from day to day, because customer 
expectations change. Nevertheless, what is important is 
that it works as a management tool for change and quality 
improvement, by making comparisons possible and by 
working in a common language. By making this purpose 
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clear, the Motorolans in general started supporting the 
Six Sigma efforts, and the Ph.D. statisticians joined as 
well, once they understood that it was a concept and a 
banner for change. In addition, Motorola today de-
emphasizes the general comparisons based on opportunity 
of error, and focuses on continually reducing and 
comparing defects of "like" processes. 
 
Early on, there was also resistance from the middle-level 
supervisors, the traditional "problem solvers", who had 
gotten their promotion because they could work around 
problems, e.g. know how to get parts if these were not 
available. The solution to this resistance was to involve 
them in the Six Sigma process of change, because here are 
always problems, waiting to be solved. 
 
 
2.8  The history of the corporation - implications 
 
A radical change of direction in a company never starts 
out from a vacuum; there is always an earlier history 
which can hinder or facilitate the transition. In the 
case of Motorola changing in the direction of TQC, a 
number of factors helped.  
 
First, the top management had a belief in change and in 
continued education and training of the human resources. 
These beliefs and the practical promotion from top 
management are cornerstones in a transition. Second, for 
several years Motorola had promoted a program of 
increased employee participation on all different levels, 
including the work in small problem-solving groups, which 
is another cornerstone of TQC. In addition, Motorola had 
a strong culture based on people's values, where respect 
for the individual is an essential ingredient, which is 
another contributing factor to the possibility of 
unleashing the potential of all employees. Third, 
Motorola already had some of the characteristics which 
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are typical of a Japanese company but not at all of a US 
firm, as regards its relation to its employees. Motorola 
had a policy of never firing employees, and after 10 
years of employment it is almost impossible to fire an 
employee; i.e. the groundwork for "life-time employment" 
existed, which is of importance when major investments in 
development of the human resources are needed. The 
Motorola family feeling was furthermore reinforced by 
employees typically having other relatives working for 
Motorola, and by institutions like the Profit Sharing 
Plan, which had been operating since 1947. 
 
On the barrier side, within Motorola there was a long 
history of success and a belief in being the best in its 
fields of business. However, according to customers, this 
also had such implications as that Motorola was known to 
treat its customers in an arrogant way, not listening to 
their complaints and suggestions. Hence, a major change 
was needed if the goal of Total Customer Satisfaction 
would be possible to reach. 
 
                                      
3.  Is Quality Used as a Tool for Change? 
 
In this section, the Motorola way of using quality as a 
tool for organizational change will be analysed. This is 
done within the framework of the model for change 
presented in section 1.3. The model emphasizes the 
importance of considering four different levels in an 
organization simultaneously, the technical, social, 
political and cultural levels, in order to accomplish a 
successful change process.  
 
 
3.1  Technical dimension 
 
The technical dimension refers to the physical technical 
system, i.e. the machinery and equipment, and to other 
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special resources developed within the organization, 
which are related to the operations. A research 
institute, with knowledge resources and all equipment 
needed for research, is one example of such a special 
resource. The present setup and possible investments in 
hardware define some of the boundaries for what it is 
possible to change on other levels in an organization. In 
the same manner, the availability of knowledge resources 
limits what it is possible to do and at what pace. 
 
For Motorola, its "in-house" semiconductor manufacturing 
capability provides a distinct advantage in a number of 
ways. Most important is probably a timing advantage. This 
means that, for example, the cellular division can obtain 
knowledge earlier than competitors of new semiconductor 
technology being developed, and it can therefore 
incorporate this technology in new product developments 
ahead of competitors. Also, it is probably possible to be 
first among customers to receive deliveries of the new 
semiconductor components. In addition, the possibilities 
to obtain components with the right characteristics for 
robust designs should at least not be less, when the 
manufacturing capability is in-house. However, the 
initial decision to invest in semiconductor fabrication 
was made already in 1949, and can be seen as part of a 
historic process leading to the company of today. The 
existence of this capability provides Motorola with a 
distinct advantage on the technical level, which enforces 
its possibilities to successfully introduce one part of 
the quality program, i.e. robust design principles. 
 
Apart from the "hardware" side, the technical dimension 
also refers to investments in "software". In order to 
further strengthen the Six Sigma process, Motorola 
created the Six Sigma Research Institute. Its purpose is 
to research and develop advanced statistical engineering 
tools (e.g. Six Sigma Research Institute is one of the 
leaders in chaos theory development), research and 
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develop advanced application methodologies, and rapidly 
transfer the technology to different parts of Motorola. 
This "think tank" on advanced methodologies is part of 
the support structure for change that Motorola has 
created, by both developing instruments and ways of 
communicating them. Most recently IBM and DEC, two 
companies which have adopted the Motorola Six Sigma 
approach, also joined as shareholders of the Six Sigma 
Research Institute. 
 
Another part of the support structure is the Motorola 
University, which provides courses for Motorola as well 
as for suppliers and other companies. Motorola has also 
assisted universities in developing their curricula, as a 
long-term change strategy. The most recent plan is to 
heavily support one general university, where 100 
professors, not only in quality statistics or management 
or in engineering disciplines, but from a variety of 
disciplines, will go to Motorola and spend some time in 
order to make a major impact on this university. 
 
 
3.2  Social dimension 
 
In contrast to the capital and other production-factor 
investments that are linked to the technical dimension, 
the social dimension refers to the human resources and 
the structure and management of these resources in an 
organization. Included in this dimension are also 
strategies, goals and their process for formulation, as 
well as the method of selecting, developing, rewarding 
and dismissing these human resources. The social 
dimension is changed mainly through formal means, 
starting from the strategy and goal formulation.  
 
The increased competition, demands on lead time and on 
quality levels, as well as the increase in technical 
complexity, have all worked as stimuli for new forms of 
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social organization. There is a need for shortening the 
development times and improving the contacts between 
persons involved during different steps. Hence, 
concurrent engineering has become an absolute requirement 
and it means that the team-player comes into focus, which 
requires a new reward system. Multi-disciplinary teams 
have become the solution. In Motorola this development 
started in the cellular business, with its less 
formalized way of management. Later, it has been diffused 
into other sectors with a more traditional way of 
working, partly by the movement of people with this kind 
of experience.  
 
Motorola uses a contract book to guide and control each 
development project. This contract book provides very 
specific rules on the resources to be used, the 
development time and the results required. During the 
course of the project, there are frequent follow-up 
meetings, to make sure that the engineers are on the 
right track and pace.  
 
Motorola exerted tremendous efforts in order to give all 
their engineers similar training. For example, in a 
mandatory course, 15,000 engineers (100%) received 
training in design for manufacturing in 8 months. This 
effort could be compared to its similar-sized Swedish 
competitor Ericsson's quality project in 1983-86 (the EQ 
project), which in some form reached a total of 15,000 
persons during 3 years' time. Motorola has put more 
emphasis on training than most other companies in the US 
or in Europe. Motorola also has a very clear focus in its 
training activities, i.e. they should be "doing-
directed".  
 
Motorola is in the process of cutting away middle-manager 
layers within the organization. The number of hierarchies 
has been reduced from 14 to 9. This step provides 
possibilities of simpler information flow and improved 
  31
communication, and the hidden human buffers (i.e. waste) 
more easily come up to the surface.  
 
Motorola installed a highly positioned general manager as 
a full- time corporate quality director, to support the 
CEO and his office, who also put very great effort into 
quality.  
 
The Motorola way of using a uniform metric, combined with 
identical goals for each possible process and job, is the 
major factor behind Motorola's pace of positive change. 
This factor not only influences the social dimension, in 
terms of providing a very clear guideline for the work. 
It also has a direct effect on both the political and the 
cultural dimension, as will be described in the following 
sections. As the Motorola way of "Management by Uniform 
Measurements" has such considerable merits, by being one 
tool which influences three different change levels, it 
has now also been adopted by giants such as IBM.  
 
 
3.3  Political dimension 
 
The political dimension concerns the task of allocating 
power and resources in an organization. The concepts and 
language regarding the political dimension are less 
formal and may not be as clear to follow as is the case 
with the technical and social dimensions.  
 
One of the most profound means of changing the power 
structure in an organization is through the succession 
order. Motorola's way of selecting the CEO, 1-2 years in 
advance and letting the new CEO work side by side with 
the retiring CEO, promotes stability. First, it secures a 
continuation of policy, which can be contrasted to the 
more common procedure in other US firms, where each new 
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CEO has to implement his own new ideas.9 Second, the risk 
is lower of losing the no. 2 or 3 candidates for the CEO 
position to a competitor, which is very common in other 
US firms, where a number of very competent candidates 
fight and only one person is the winner. This succession 
focus has provided Motorola with a strength to carry 
through its TQC change project. Such a project must have 
a long-term commitment to be successful. 
 
The way of selecting top people in Motorola is also a way 
of securing political power across different functional 
specialities, giving quality a dominating position 
("quality first"). This was done through the succession 
on the top level, but the promotion and reward structure 
also provides a way of choosing which persons to promote 
on other managerial levels. The uniform-metric system is 
one contributing means to evaluate managers, in order to 
promote those whose department shows the improvements 
needed, and to move those managers aside who do not stand 
up to the right level of leadership or commitment to the 
Six Sigma quality goal. On this level the Motorola way is 
politically mechanistic, while on other levels Motorola 
has promoted a more organic policy of participative 
management.  
 
In Motorola, the policy and key goals are set by the top 
management and communicated downwards. The participation 
comes on other levels. For example, in the case of 
product development, the short-term goals on a more 
practical level are developed through close interaction 
between the development team and the management. The 
Motorola way of measuring all work processes, in terms of 
their "defects per unit" result, is one of the most 
powerful stimuli of change in Motorola. The goal of Six 
Sigma capability by 1992 is the same for the whole 
company, and it has been set by the top management. On 
                                                          
9. Such was the case in Florida Power & Light, the first non-Japanese winner of the 
Deming Quality Prize, which after a shift of CEO lost its focus on TQC.  
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the other hand, the way in which the calculations are 
made, of defects per unit in relation to the number of 
opportunities for error, is essentially a question for 
each level concerned. Thus, the Motorola approach of 
"Management by Uniform Measurements" is being influenced 
on different levels. Besides being a general instrument 
of communication and comparison on all different levels, 
it is also a most essential top management instrument for 
balancing the power across groups and departments within 
the whole corporation. 
 
Motorola has formed a large number of TCS teams, which is 
an example of the strategy of participative management, 
i.e. political influence on the shop floor level. These 
teams have freedom in such respects as that they can 
choose their team members and select the problems and the 
tools to use to solve the problems. The only requirement 
is that the TCS team identifies which one or more of the 
five key initiatives10 that will be improved as a result 
of their project. This is a key point for the successful 
empowerment of the employees and it is based on the 
notion that management understands that the improvement 
of anyone of the key initiatives contributes to a better 
business. Of this follows, that management must support 
the team in its choice of improvement project, even if 
management thinks that it is not the most important issue 
to work on. Hence, this is one step that Motorola has 
taken towards empowerment and better use of the 
capabilities and inputs from all employee levels, i.e. it 
is a consistent part of a TQC approach. 
 
 
                                                          
 
10. Motorola's five key initiatives are: the six sigma goal of defect reduction, total cycle 
time reduction, product and manufacturing leadership, profit improvement, and 
participative management. 
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3.4  Cultural dimension 
 
The cultural dimension concerns the values, beliefs and 
interpretations of past and current events held by the 
individuals in the organization.  
 
Motorola consistently communicates its values and beliefs 
through all available media and channels. In short, 
Motorola has used TQC as a tool for making a major change 
of its corporate culture. 
 
To increase the motivation for change, Motorola has put 
the focus on an external enemy, the Japanese competitors. 
Motorola used this outside enemy in a very consistent 
way, starting from benchmarkings and continuing by the 
CEO sending out the message that every individual had to 
compete with his counterpart in the Japanese competitor 
companies. Furthermore, Motorola communicated the message 
from the standpoint of its importance for Motorola's 
survival. One of the senior Motorolans expressed it in 
this way: "If we hadn't had the Japanese, we would have 
had to invent them." 
 
In the cultural dimension, Motorola has done a thorough 
job in transforming itself into a company with a customer 
focus. Total Customer Satisfaction has been the guiding 
principle since its introduction in 1987. Motorola has 
used an array of means to communicate the message and 
transform the Motorola culture. Symbolic gestures have 
been made, and later communicated through interviews, 
articles, speeches, etc., to become part of the company 
history. One example of these symbolic gestures is when 
the CEO puts quality on top of the agenda for the 
meetings with the Operating and Policy Committee, leaving 
the meetings after this matter has been finished and 
discussion about operating results is to begin. The 
message is clear for everyone, not least for other senior 
managers: quality is number one for the CEO and for 
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Motorola. Other examples are the top managers visiting 
customers regularly (the message is customer focus), and 
the "bandit line" in the pager factory, i.e. steal every 
good idea you can find and implement it (the message is 
to break down all NIH walls). Yet another example is the 
little plastic card every Motorolan is supposed to carry 
with him all the time, with the key beliefs, the key 
goals, the key initiatives printed on one side, and the 
most fundamental message printed on the other side: 
everyone's overriding responsibility is "Total Customer 
Satisfaction".  
 
These are all symbolic actions, which are communicated 
out into the Motorola organization in a consistent way, 
in order to work as a tool for changing the culture. They 
have been further reinforced by the way of rewarding and 
promoting people; the most outstanding example is the 
promotion of the new CEO, George Fischer, with a quality 
background, but this is also a more general trend 
throughout the organization.  
 
According to the Japanese model, in addition to top 
management's real involvement, the use of "success 
stories" has been one of the most important means of 
diffusing TQC (Shiba 1989). Motorola has also used this 
means, in the same consistent way: for example, by 
communicating the improvement of quality and leadtime in 
the case of pagers, and the result in terms of a 30% 
share of the Japanese market.  
 
Motorola has throughout used a "visible" and explicit way 
of communicating what it wants its culture to become. 
Since the uniform metric was introduced, a directly 
comparable quantitative measure of quality level has also 
been available, and has greatly helped in convincing 
Motorolans of the need for change and the possibility of 
changing. 
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By being the first winner of the Malcolm Baldrige 
National Award in 1988, Motorola has an obligation to 
communicate what it knows about quality to the rest of US 
industry. In order to communicate the Motorola Story 
outside of Motorola, a very consistent way of describing 
all changes and measures had to be developed. However, 
these thorough descriptions made for the external world 
also further reinforce the change process and the 
development of the new culture at Motorola. Throughout 
Motorola this is visible, and there are few companies 
that can show such a consistent way of describing their 
history and critical events, which is a clear indication 
of the pervasive strength the Motorola TQC approach has 
had all through the organization. 
 
 
3.5  Quality - a tool for change 
 
The answer is definitely YES to the question raised at 
the beginning of this section. Quality is used as a tool 
for change. Furthermore, it is used in a very consistent 
and thorough way, simultaneously influencing all four 
dimensions: the technical, social, political and 
cultural. There are variations between different units 
and sections of the large Motorola organization in how 
far the total quality approach has reached. But as a 
whole, it is impressive to see how greatly the message of 
total customer satisfaction and defect-free production 
has pervaded the organization and made Motorolans change 
their way of thinking and acting.  
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4.  Management implications 
 
What is meant by total quality control (TQC) or total 
quality management (TQM)? TQC or TQM stands for good 
management, which makes it possible for a corporation to 
benefit from the full resources of all individuals in the 
organization. There are some general truths in the above 
concepts, such as: the importance of a customer focus, 
the importance of top management involvement, the 
importance of involving all personnel, and the importance 
of clear communication.  
 
There is also an accompanying set of quality tools and 
methods available for a company to choose from. This set 
or "tool box", has continuously been developed and new 
tools have been added. What really matters for the 
outcome of the TQC process is, however, that the strategy 
and tools selected are really implemented. Here we find a 
general weakness in Western industry. Many of the tools 
have been known for a very long time, but the potential 
benefits have not been reached. This is a main difference 
from Japanese industry, where one major strength is that 
the tools selected are also implemented and used.  
 
In Japan, the tool box has been developed gradually. 
Starting from a focus on production and continuous 
improvement, TQC is now largely a matter of research and 
development, in order to better satisfy the customer. 
However, in Japan, JUSE has made a prescription of what 
tools are suitable for Japanese industry. This has a 
major advantage in terms of a wider diffusion of TQC into 
the industry in general. However, on the negative side, 
this way of prescribing the tools and the way of working 
may also be a bit rigid. Of course, the most successful 
large Japanese corporations do not stop at using the 
prescribed method and tools. They break new ground, which 
will later be incorporated in the JUSE prescriptions for 
wider diffusion. 
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In a similar way, Motorola has been breaking new ground: 
first, by benchmarking, identifying and analyzing what 
Japanese and other excellent companies were doing. The 
next step was to incorporate all good ideas from Japan or 
from other parts of the world into Motorola's own 
practice. Finally came essential ingredients based on 
Motorola's own history, and from the cultural context 
where the company is working. The essential lesson is 
that, once Motorola decided on using a TQC way of 
working, including their own Six Sigma process, it used 
all efforts to implement and make the ideas work.     
 
Hence, an important management implication is that when a 
company decides on using TQC as a framework for change, 
and selects a specific set of ingredients and tools, it 
must implement this in a consistent way. To be 
successful, it needs a major change in ways of doing 
things, which requires a major effort and a focus on TQC. 
As TQC by definition implies a total commitment, half-
hearted approaches rarely give a promising result. In 
that case, the company may be wiser to select another 
stimulus of change, which it can focus upon and implement 
thoroughly. 
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